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NOTES
more protection than subsequent purchasers, as Louisiana ap-
parently does.
With the law in its present state, it seems apparent that rec-
ordation is essential to give mortgages effectiveness against
third persons. If it is desirable to place mortgages on the same
footing as conveyances and give them effect against third per-
sons from the time of filing, whether or not they are ever re-
corded, it seems that this will have to be accomplished through
the appropriate constitutional processes. Until the constitutional
barrier is overcome, mortgages should be effective against third
persons from the time of filing only if the filing is followed by
timely recordation.
Carl H. Hanchey
SECURITY DEVICES - RANKING OF COLLATERAL MORTGAGE
SECURING REISSUED MORTGAGE NOTE
Defendant was indebted to one Morgan for $114,000, a sum
secured by the pledge of four collateral mortgage notes bearing
the face amount of $220,000. Subsequent to the recordation of
the collateral mortgages defendant had granted various other
duly recorded mortgages on the same property. Later plaintiff
paid defendant's indebtedness to Morgan, and defendant reissued
the collateral mortgage notes to plaintiff in pledge to secure its
promissory note for $120,000. Plaintiff instituted proceedings
to enforce the collateral mortgage, and holders of the notes se-
cured by the mortgages granted subsequent to recordation of
the collateral mortgage but prior to reissuance of the collateral
mortgage notes intervened asserting priority over plaintiff. The
trial court upheld the interveners' claims, and on appeal the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed that portion of the
judgment. Held, inter alia, a collateral mortgage, in competition
with other mortgages, is ranked from the date of issuance or
reissuance of the note secured by it and not from the date of
recordation of the collateral mortgage. Odom v. Cherokee Homes,
Inc., 165 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), writs denied, 246
La. 867, 167 So. 2d 677 ("no error of law").
As the Louisiana conventional mortgage is an accessory se-
curity device,1 it must be founded on a principal debt 2 which it
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3284 (1870).
2. Id. art. 3285.
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is intended to secure, and when the principal debt is extin-
guished3 the mortgage likewise disappears. 4  If the mortgage
has been given for a specific debt, and the debt is extinguished,
no reissue of the mortgage note5 or later advance on the note6
can revive the mortgage. 7 Obviously, the commercial possibili-
ties of this type of mortgage are very limited, primarily because
a single mortgage cannot secure transactions where the amount
advanced fluctuates and frequently is totally paid, or where dif-
ferent persons make advances from time to time to the same
mortgagor.8 This commercial void left open by the ordinary
conventional mortgage is filled in Louisiana by two closely re-
lated security devices: the mortgage for future advances, and
the collateral mortgage.9
Where continuous dealings between the same parties are an-
ticipated, and the security of a mortgage is desirable, the mort-
gage to secure future advances is available for use.10 As a con-
3. The methods of extinguishing obligations are set forth in LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 2130 (1870). Note, however, that when the debt is extinguished by novation
it is possible to preserve the mortgage which secured the original obligation. Id.
art. 2195.
4. Id. arts. 3285, 3411(4).
5. Lacoste v. Hickey, 203 La. 794, 14 So. 2d 639 (1943) ; Hibernia Nat'l Bank
v. Succession of Gragard, 109 La. 677, 33 So. 728 (1903) ; Succession of Phillips,
49 La. Ann. 1019, 22 So. 202 (1897) (dictum) ; Taylor v. Rous, Mann. Unrep.
Cas. 331 (La. 1880) ; Hill v. Hall, 4 Rob. 416 (La. 1843) ; Avant v. Hodge, 6
La. App. 290 (2d Cir. 1927) ; cf. People's Bank v. Erwin, 238 Fed. 791 (5th Cir.
1917) ; Smith v. Vinson, 7 La. App. 309 (2d Cir. 1927).
6. Mente & Co. v. Levy, 160 La. 496, 107 So. 318 (1926) ; cf. Polito v. Ferraro,
155 So. 477 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934).
7. However, the maker and his succession can be liable on the reissued note as
for an ordinary debt. Succession of LeBesque, 139 La. 1087, 72 So. 745 (1916) ;
Hill v. Hall, 4 Rob. 416 (La. 1843) ; cf. Taylor v. Rous, Mann. Unrep. Cas. 331
(La. 1880). See also Schepp v. Smith, 35 La. Ann. 1, 7 (1883), where a dis-
senting Justice takes the position that when a mortgage note is returned to the
maker and by him reissued, the note may be an enforceable negotiable instrument,
but that the mortgage once attached to the note is now dead.
8. See generally, Comment, 34 TUL. L. REV. 800 (1960).
9. This Note attempts to use the terms "mortgage for future advances" and
"collateral mortgage" in the sense defined at notes 10 through 19 infra, and notes
20 through 25 infra. However, it must be admitted that the jurisprudence has not
always made such a distinction, and frequently it is difficult to discern what type
mortgage exists in a given case.
10. At least two common transactions fall within this area: the first is where
the parties seek to secure a single agreement for cumulative advances up to a cer-
tain sum, usually for a specified purpose; the second is where the parties seek to
secure the balance of an open account, upon which periodic debits and credits are
contemplated. The use of the mortgage device to secure these two transactions
may not be equally in accord with the principle of accessory, and perhaps it could
be argued that the Code does not so clearly allow the second type as it seems to
sanction the first. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3292-3293 (1870). However, no case
has ever attempted such a distinction; in fact the jurisprudence has been con-
sistent in equating the mortgage for obligations which have not yet risen into
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cession to commercial needs this type of mortgage is expressly
sanctioned by the Civil Code," though it may depart somewhat
.from the accessory principle of the ordinary conventional mort-
gage.' 2 It is not necessary that any primary obligation be in ex-
istence at the date of the mortgage, 3 and it is not essential that
the mortgage state on its face that it is given to secure future
advances. 1 4 Whether the mortgage is classified as one to secure
existence with the mortgage to secure the balance of an open account. See, e.g.,
In re York, 30 Fed. Cas. 811 (No. 18,138) (D. La. 1870), which involved a mort-
gage given to secure the balance of an open account. The mortgage was drawn in
the amount of $25,000, over $50,000 in total advances were actually made, and
somewhat over $25,000 had been repaid, leaving a balance of slightly more than
$25,000. It was held that the mortgage was good for its face amount and was not
extinguished by reimbursement of the first $25,000. See also Alex Hutchinson &
Son v. Riggs-Terrell Lumber Co., 138 La. 355, 70 So. 324 (1915) ; cf. Edward J.
Gay & Co. v. Deynoodt, 27 La. Ann. 249 (1875) ; Durrive v. Key, 20 La. Ann.
154 (1868).
Additionally, today the future advance mortgage has found special uses, and
received statutory recognition in relation to other transactions. See LA. R.S.
6:767-767.1, 6:835.1-835.2 (Supp. 1964) (advance on outstanding mortgage by
homestead association for taxes and other purposes); id. 9:4801 (mortgage for
future advances recorded before labor begun or material furnished on construction
project). Peculiar problems may be introduced by these special statutes. See text
of these statutes at note 30 infra.
11. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3292-93 (1870). The French Civil Code contains
no corresponding articles, however, it is generally conceded that a mortgage for
future advances is valid in France. See 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN
ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2652
(1959) ; In re York, 30 Fed. Cas. 811 (No. 18,138) (D. La. 1870) ; Walmsley v.
Resweber, 105 La. 522, 535, 30 So. 5, 12 (1899) (concurring opinion) ; Pickers-
gill & Co. v. Brown, 7 La. Ann. 297 (1852) ; cf. Alex Hutchinson'& Son v. Riggs-
Terrell Lumber Co., 138 La. 355, 70 So. 324 (1915).
12. This possible departure from the principle of accessory lies in the fact that
it is arguable some vitality is accorded to the mortgage before the principal obliga-
tion comes into existence - a retroactive effect for ranking purposes after the
advance is made. The French commentators have explained a similar result there
by arguing that actually the contract to make the advances or to sell on open
account serves as the principal obligation and that the later execution is only the
fulfillment of the obligation. Where the future advance is not obligatory from
the terms of the original contract, this theory may not offer a complete explana-
tion. However, the same result has been rationalized even under the optional ad-
vance agreement on the ground that modern business practices prevent the obliga-
tions from being purely potestative. See generally Comment, 34 TuL. L. REV.
800, 806 (1960), where the French position is thoroughly investigated. From the
terms of LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3293 (1870) the same explanation may be plausible:
"... The fulfillment of the promise . . . shall impart to the mortgage a retro-
spective effect to the time of the contract." (Emphasis added.)It may be possible from the terms of the Code to fully reconcile the mortgage
for future advances with the principle of accessory. The mortgage must state a
maximum sum on its face, LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3309 (1870), and it could be con-
tended that when the total advances made equalled the maximum amount secured
by the mortgage, then subsequent payments, reducing the balance due, would only
cause the mortgage to be extinguished pro tanto - later advances would thus be
unsecured. However, this rationale has not found approval in the jurisprudence.
13. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3292 (1870) : "A mortgage may be given for an obli-
gation which has not yet risen into existence. . . . " See Pickersgill & Co. v.
Brown, 7 La. Ann. 297 (1852) ; 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2652 (1959).
14. Pickersgill & Co. v. Brown, 7 La. Ann. 297 (1852).
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-future advances is determined solely from the intention of the
parties, I5, and to be secured by the mortgage the advances must
be within the contemplated life of the mortgage.' 6 Of course,
until the advances are actually made, the mortgage is totally un-
enforceable. 17 It is yet unclear what effect will flow if the mort-
gagee is not obligated to make the future advance, or the mort-
gagor is not actually obligated to borrow from the mortgagee.
Some cases have indicated that such an arrangement is equiva-
lent to an obligation contracted on a potestative condition, and
have concluded that the mortgage could only take effect from
the date of the advance.' Other cases, while purporting to rest
on the fact that the Code expressly allows mortgages for future
advances, have still found it necessary to conclude that the mort-
gagee was bound to make the advances if so requested. 19
On the other hand, where the mortgagor anticipates his fu-
ture borrowing may be from different persons he may choose to
draw his security in the form of. a collateral mortgage, a crea-
ture of practice which has been sanctioned by the jurisprudence.
Usually, the mortgage is drawn in favor of future holders and
recorded in the name of a nominal mortgagee. 20 The note identi-
fied with the mortgage2' may then be pledged as collateral se-
curity for obligations, and though the obligation be extinguished
and the mortgage note returned to the maker, the existence of
the mortgage remains unaffected. 22 Subsequently, contrary to
15. Ibid.
16. Flower v. O'Bannon, 43 La. Ann. 1042, 10 So. 376 (1891).
17. See 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTItUTE) no. 2652 (1959). At the time the credit comes
into being, a principal obligation is created to which the mortgage then attaches.
18. Langfitt v. Brown, 5 La. Ann. 231, 232 (1850) ; Meeker v. Commissioners,
2 La. Ann. 971, 973 (1847) ; cf. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2028, 2041 (1870).
19. Cf. Hortman-Salmen Co. v. White, 168 La. 1057, 123 So. 711 (1929)
Pickersgill & Co. v. Brown, 7 La. Ann. 297 (1852).
20. See generally Comment, 34 TUL. L. REV. 800, 808 (1960). Whether the
mortgagor was indebted to the nominal mortgagee is immaterial. Richardson v.
Cramer, 28 La. Ann. 357 (1876).
21. To give mortgage rights to note holders, the note must be identified in the
act of mortgage, and it must be clear that the notes are secured by the mortgage.
Durrive v. Key, 20 La. Ann. 154 (1868).
i 22. Lacoste v. Hickey, 203 La. 794, 14 So. 2d 639 (1943) (dictum) ; Hammond
State Bank & Trust Co. v. Broderick, 179 La. 693, 154 So. 739 (1934) ; Indus-
trial Loan Co. v. Hendricks, 179 La. 342, 154 So. 18 (1934); Buckeye Cotton
'Oil Co. v. Amrhein, 168 La. 139, 121 So. 602 (1929) ; Citizens' Nat'l Bank v.
"Loranger, 163 La. 868, 113 So. 129 (1927) ; Hollingsworth v. Ratcliff, 162 La.
281, 110 So. 422 (1926) ; Commercial Germania Trust & Savings Bank v. White,
145 La. 54, 81 So. 753 (1919) (dictum) ; Succession of Phillips, 49 La. Ann. 1019,
22 So. 202 (1897) ; Berber v. Thompson, 47 La. Ann. 800, 17 So. 318 (1895)
Levy v. Ford, 41 La. Ann. 873, 6 So. 671 (1889) ; Rex Finance Co. v. Cary, 145
So. 2d 672 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), aff'd 244 La. 675, 154 So. 2d 360 (1963)
Lampton Reid & Co. v. Fortenberry, 168 So. 36 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936).
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'the result of a similar transaction based upon the ordinary con-
ventional mortgage, the mortgagor is free to reissue the mort-
'gage note as security for other obligations.2" Undeniably, the
mortgagor could accomplish the same result by issuing separate
mortgages to secure later debts after paying earlier debts or
otherwise extinguishing other mortgages ;24 the collateral mort-
gage allows him to accomplish the same thing at much less ex-
pense and trouble. At any given time, the pledgee of the mort-
gage note is allowed to enforce the mortgage only to the extent
of the outstanding obligation for which the mortgage note is
then pledged.2 5
In competition between creditors holding ordinary conven-
tional mortgages, the competing mortgages will. rank from date
of filing in the recorder's office, at least if timely recorded
thereafter. 26 In relation to the mortgage for future advances,
the Code provides that the "fulfillment of the promise . . . im-
part [s] to the mortgage a retrospective effect to the time of the
contract,' 27 and the jurisprudence generally agrees that when
the principal obligation is actually fulfilled, the mortgage secur-
ing it will rank from recordation.2 8 Thus, if another mortgage
is granted after the mortgage for future advances is recorded,
and the advance is subsequently made, the other mortgage will
be junior in rank.29 Special statutory provisions on future ad-
23. See cases cited in note 22 supra.
24. Herber v. Thompson, 47 La. Ann. 800, 809, 17 So. 318, 321 (1895).
25. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 696 (1960) : ". . . The pledgee may en-
force the entire right judicially, unless it is an obligation of the pledgor, in which
event it may be enforced only to the extent of the indebtedness secured by the
pledge." See, e.g., Crowley Bank & Trust Co. v. Hurd, 137 La. 787, 69 So. 175
'(1915).
26. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3329, 3342, 3358 (1870), as modified by LA. R.S.
9:5141 (1950). Compare LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 19. See also Kinnebrew v.
Tri-Con Production Corp., 244 La. 879, 154 So. 2d 433 (1963), noted 25 LA. L.
REV. 783 (1965). holding that where the recordation is timely made after filing,
the mortgage will rank from date of filing. Though Kinnebrew reflects the current
rule, most of the cases in the area under consideration were decided prior to the
enactment of the statutory basis for Kinnebrew and at a time when recordation
date was the rule. To simplify the text discussion, the term "recordation" will
be utilized to indicate the effective date for ranking purposes in the light of Kinne-
brew.
27. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3293 (1870).
28. In re York, 30 Fed. Cas. 811 (No. 18,138) (D. La. 1870), Hortman-
Salmen Co. v. White, 168 La. 1057, 123 So. 711 (1929) ; Alex Hutchinson & Son
v. 'Riggs-Terrell Lumber Co., 138 La. 355, 70 So. 324 (1915) ; Gladney v. Man-
'ning, 48 La. Ann. 316, 19 So. 276 (1896) (dictum) ; Pickersgill & Co. v. Brown,17 La. Ann. 297 (1852) ; Brander v. Bowmar, 16 La. 370 (1840). See 2 PLANIOL,
.CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW
INSTITtITE) no. 2652 (1959). But see Meeker v. Commissioners, 2 La. Ann. 971
'(1847).
. 29. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3293 (1870) Pickersgill & Co. v. Brown, 7 La.
Ann. 297 (1852). ! .
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vance mortgages in certain situations also indicate a similar
result.80 When an earlier recorded collateral mortgage comes
into competition with another mortgage recorded prior to the
pledge of the mortgage notes, the result is less clear. Language
may be gleaned from several cases indicating that the recorda-
tion date of the collateral mortgage determines its rank, just as
the rank of the ordinary conventional mortgage and the mort-
gage for future advances is determined.3 1 These cases obviously
draw upon the strong analogy between the collateral mortgage
and the mortgage for future advances. 32 However, when an in-
tervening mortgage is involved, the courts have refused to rely
on these broad statements, and they have instead ranked the col-
lateral mortgage from the date of the obligation for which it was
pledged or repledged 3
In the instant case little more than a determination of fact
was required, and once it was resolved that the collateral mort-
30. LA. R.S. 6:767 (Supp. 1964) : "During the existence of any . . . mortgage
any association may advance to the borrower money for the payment of taxes, in-
surance premiums, special assessments on, repairs, additions and improvements
to and remodeling and maintenance of, the property on which the original loan
was made, provided that the aggregate of such advances when added to the balance
due on the amount of the original loan shall not exceed the original amount ofi
said loan. These advances . . . shall be secured by the same .. . mortgage securing
the original note. . . " (Emphasis added.) Id. 6:767.1 provides that if the ad-
vance is made for any purpose other than those listed in the above statute then
the advance shall not prime any encumbrance recorded between the time of re-
cordation of the original mortgage and the date of the advance. Otherwise, the
advances are effective from the date of the original mortgage's recordation. See
also id. 6:835.1-835.2.
Id. 9:4801C: "When a mortgage note has been executed by the owner of the
immovable for the purpose of securing advances to be made in the future, and the
mortgage has been recorded and the note delivered to the lender before any work
or labor has begun or material been furnished, or before the recordation of a
building contract, the amount of the advances made thereafter shall be deemed
secured by the mortgage in precedence to and with priority over any of the claims
had under the privileges conferred by Sub-Section A of this Section, except as
stated in Sub-Section D hereof [dealing with laborers' privilege]."
See also id. 3:207 (1950).
31. Of. Citizens' Nat'l Bank v. Loranger, 163 La. 868, 113 So. 129 (1927)
Herber v. Thompson, 47 La. Ann. 800, 17 So. 318 (1895) ; Morris v. Cain, 39 La.
Ann. 712, 1 So. 797 (1887) ; Lampton Reid & Co. v. Fortenberry, 168 So. 36 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1936).
32. See, e.g., Morris v. Cain, 39 La. Ann. 712, 1 So. 797 (1887).
33. E.g., Walmsley v. Resweber, 105 La. 522, 532, 30 So. 5, 9 (1899) : "To
illustrate, A. executes a mortgage in favor of B. to secure the payment of six notes
of $500 each. He delivers two of the notes to B., and retains the four others in his
own possession. Some time after, he executes a mortgage in favor of C. He can-
not, after he has executed this mortgage in favor of C., place the four notes in
circulation to the prejudice of C.'s mortgage." Cf. Hammond State Bank & Trust
Co. v. Broderick, 179 La. 693, 154 So. 739 (1934) (intervening attachment of
homestead rights) ; Richardson v. Cramer, 28 La. Ann. 357 (1876) ; D'Meza v.
Generes, 22 La. Ann. 285 (1870) ; Rex Finance Co. v. Cary, 145 So. 2d 672 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1962), aff'd 244 La. 675, 154 So. 2d 360 (1963) ; Scallan v. Simmes-
port State Bank, 129 So. 2d 49 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
gage note had been repledged to the plaintiff rather than pur-
chased by him, the case called for application of established rules
concerning reissued collateral mortgages. The determination of
fact by the court can hardly be questioned. Yet the case serves
as a particularly good illustration of the incongruity between
the ranking dates of the mortgage for future advances and the
collateral mortgage.
Though theoretical distinctions S4 may be urged between the
collateral mortgage and the mortgage for future advances, the
two security devices are strikingly similar in function, and it
has even been assumed that there is no real distinction between
the two.3 5 Though never clearly expressed, perhaps the under-
lying reason for the later ranking date of the collateral mortgage
is a fear that it could be readily utilized to defraud creditors
through the simple expedient of executing and recording a col-
lateral mortgage in the hope of later pledging it to a friendly or
collusive creditor who could then prime all intervening mort-
gagees. Certainly the collateral mortgage could be used for any
purpose germane to the mortgage for future advances,36 though
the latter may not be used for the entire range of purposes
served by the collateral mortgage. Any fear that collateral mort-
34. The prime difference lies in the fact the mortgage for future advances
could be drawn in such a fashion that there would 'be an obligation to make the
advance on the part of the mortgagee and a corresponding obligation in the mort-
gagor to utilize the mortgage, thus abrogating any possible argument based on
potestative conditions, see text accompanying notes 18 and 19 supra, while the
collateral mortgage would always arguably be based on a potestative condition,
since the mortgagor would never be obligated to utilize it as security, even if he
did borrow money. See note 12 supra. Compare Pickersgill & Co. v. Brown, 7 La.
Ann. 297 (1852), with Walmsley v. Resweber, 105 La. 522, 30 So. 5 (1899) and
Langfitt v. Brown, 5 La. Ann. 231 (1850).
35. See Comment, 34 TUL. L. REV. 800, 808 (1960).
36. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3158 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1952, No.
290, § 1: ". . . [W]henever a pledge of any instrument . . . listed in this article
[promissory notes, bills of exchange, bills of lading, stocks, bonds, etc.] is made
to secure a particular loan or debt, or to secure advances to be made up to a cer-
tain amount, and, if so desired or provided, to secure any other obligations or
liabilities of the pledger to the pledgee, then existing or thereafter arising, up to
the limit of the pledge, and the pledged instrument . . . remains . . . in the hands
of the pledgee, the instrument . . . may remain in pledge to the pledgee or, with-
out withdrawal from the hands of the pledgee, be repledged to the pledgee to
secure at any time any renewal or renewals of the original loan or any part there-
of or any new or additional loans, even though the original loan has been reduced
or paid, up to the total limit which it was agreed should be secured by the pledge,
and, if so desired or provided, to secure any other obligations or liabilities of the
pledger to the pledgee, then existing or thereafter arising, up to the limit of the
pledge, without any added notification or other formality, and the pledge shall be
valid as well against third persons as against the pledger thereof, if made in good
faith; and such renewals, additional loans and advances or other obligations or
liabilities shall be secured by the collateral to the same e.Ttent as if they came into
existence when the instrument ... was originally pledged. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
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gages could be used for purposes of fraud surely must overlook
the fact that the mortgage for future advances could likewise be
used for fraudulent purposes, and in spite of this possibility the
legislature decided to grant the latter the benefit of a retroactive
operation for its ranking date. If the collateral mortgage's ex-
istence is to be supported by analogy to the mortgage for future
advances, it is arguable that the policy behind the latter should
weigh toward granting the former a similar retroactive effect.
Further, fraud arguments ignore creditors' remedies under both
state8 7 and federal38 law.
In both types of mortgages the existence of the claim or po-
tential claim and its maximum amount 39 are inscribed on the
public records. While a prospective creditor may not be able to
determine from the public records whether a given mortgage is
an ordinary conventional mortgage or a mortgage intended by
the mortgagor and mortgagee to secure future advances, the
standard form for collateral mortgages will carry notice of the
instrument's character.40 Thus, whether the mortgage be one
for future advances or for collateral security, in neither case
may a creditor logically argue that he was misled about the po-
tential existence of claims against the mortgagor's property.
Based on the information acquired from the public records, the
potential lender is free to decide whether to accept a later re-
corded mortgage as security for an obligation. It seems plau-
sible that beyond this information about potential claims, it is
none of the potential creditor's concern whether there is an out-
standing obligation for which the mortgage is presently secur-
ity. Protection against abuse of either type of mortgage is af-
forded, since the mortgagor risks a great deal by allowing re-
cordation of an unused mortgage: the amount he could obtain
on any subsequent mortgage is considerably reduced.
It may be seriously contended that to rank the collateral
mortgage from date of recordation of the mortgage rather than
pledge of the mortgage note would be too gross a deviation from
the principle of accessory - a deviation not sufficiently counte-
nanced by analogy to the mortgage for future advances. Cer-
37. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1969 (1870).
38. Bankruptcy Act § 67d, 11 U.S.C. § 107d (1952) ; note broad definition of
"transfer" in Bankruptcy Act § 1(30), 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1952).
39. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3309 (1870).
40. A widely used collateral mortgage form is found in WooDwAED, LOUISIANA
NOTARIAL MAN-AL 166 (2d ed. 1962).
[Vol. XXV
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tainly it must be conceded that the principle of accessory is basic
to civilian mortgage law; on the other hand, the mortgage for
future advances. does not constitute the sole departure from the
accessorial theory of mortgage. For example, both the private
building contract law 4' and, to a lesser extent, the law govern-
ing homestead associations 2 recognize use of a mortgage in sit-
uations which could not be covered by the ordinary conventional
mortgage because of its accessory nature, and in the Civil Code
the whole system of tacit mortgages operates with a retroactive
date similar to the mortgage for future advances.
43
Ranking the collateral mortgage from recordation would
probably simplify its repledge and somewhat reduce the cost of
furnishing security, particularly in the case of relatively small
loans on which the normal costs of insuring security would
otherwise be prohibitive. As far as the rank of the collateral
mortgage in competition with later recorded mortgages is con-
cerned, it may be surmised that many lenders would be satisfied
with a title opinion of a reputable attorney or a mortgage cer-
tificate -rendered at the time of recordation. However, the care-
ful attorney would likely insist upon a new examination at time
of repledge of the collateral mortgage notes in any event, to
ascertain whether security devices which prime mortgages 44
have attached to the property subsequent to the original exami-
nation or certificate.
45
Perhaps the gravest indictment of the present rule on the
ranking of collateral mortgages is illustrated in the Odom case.
Both the pledgor and the pledgee were apparently acting under
41. LA. R.S. 9:4801C (Supp. 1964).
42. Id. 676-676.1 (Supp. 1964).
43. See 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2652 (1959).
44. E.g., federal tax liens. See DAINOW, SECURITY DEVICES 207 (1956).
45. One difficulty with the present rule is illustrated in Scallan v. Simmesport
State Bank, 129 So. 2d 49 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961), where a collateral mortgage
was recorded in 1949, and the mortgage note was either issued or reissued in 1956
to secure payment of a note. In the interim the, mortgagor and his wife were di-
vorced, and he conveyed the property against which the mortgage was inscribed
to the latter in settlement of her community property rights. The pledgee sought
to enforce the mortgage, and the transferees from the wife succeeded in obtaining
an injunction. "[T]he mortgage remained dormant and imperfect until the notes
were reissued on which date it revived and took effect but could not do so to the
prejudice to the intervening right of Mrs. Scallan who had acquired record title
to the property." Id. at 52-53. The change suggested in this Note would require
a reversal in the Scallan decision; yet it can hardly be argued that transferees
would be prejudiced for the potential claim would clearly appear from the public
records. It would thus be up to the transferee to refuse title until the inscription
was erased.
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professional advice, and it is clear there was an intent to pre-
serve the rank of the collateral mortgage over the mortgages of
the interveners. This rank could have been preserved by novat-
ing the debt, coupled with an express reservation of the mort-
gage right,46 or by having the plaintiff purchase the mortgage
note.47 Notwithstanding these possibilities, very similar action
of the parties here failed to accomplish the intended result. Can
such subtle distinctions as exist in this area of the law be de-
fended in light of their operation to defeat the clear intent of
contracting parties who act under professional advice?
Probably it would have been inappropriate for the Odoin
court, as an intermediate appellate court faced with precedents
of the Supreme Court, to rule that the collateral mortgage ranks
from date of recordation instead of date of pledge or repledge of
the mortgage notes. Since the rule is one of the jurisprudence
rather than of the legislature, the Supreme Court could certain-
ly make a change, though its likelihood of so acting is greatly
reduced by the well-known reluctance to tamper with prior hold-
ings upon which persons may have relied in acquiring rights in
and against immovable property. In spite of this recognized judi-
cial self restraint, in dissenting from refusal to grant writs in
Odom, the Chief Justice may have indicated dissatisfaction with
the rule when he stated that the judgment was "not only errone-
ous but most inequitable. '4 It is thus submitted that the legis-
lature should consider extending the rule of retroactivity to pro-
vide that the collateral mortgage, like the mortgage for future
advances, will be ranked from date of recordation. 49
Kenneth D. McCoy, Jr.
46. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2195 (1870).
47. See Lampton Reid & Co. v. Fortenberry, 168 So. 36, 38-39, on rehearing,
168 So. 711, 712 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936).
48. Odom v. Cherokee Homes, Inc., 246 La. 867, 167 So. 2d 677 (1964).
49. In light of the Odom holding, any such change would probably have to
operate only prospectively to avoid constitutional difficulties. However, consid-
eration of this point is beyond the scope of this Note.
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